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1. Introduction 
 
Credit market imperfections are frequently cited as a primary impediment to efficient 
resource allocation in developing economies.  As described by Petrick (2005) and Diagne, Zeller 
and Sharma (2000), two broad methods have been employed to empirically identify the 
importance of credit rationing.  In the “indirect” method, researchers use assets or some other 
measured variable to divide the sample into groups that are more and less likely to be rationed.  
An Euler equation is then estimated.  The dependence of consumption patterns on transitory 
income shocks is taken as evidence of imperfect access to (consumption) credit (Zeldes 1989).  
Thus in this indirect method, consumption and resource allocation decisions are used to “back-
out” the incidence of credit rationing. The “direct” method, in a sense, reverses the order of 
analysis.  Researchers first attempt to directly measure whether or not a household is credit 
rationed and then evaluate the impact of the constraint by estimating a second stage equation (for 
example restricted profit or yield) that provides a household specific measure of the shadow 
value of capital (Feder et. al. 1990, Petrick 2004).   
While this method is perhaps more attractive because a broad range of “impact” 
questions can be addressed via the second stage estimation, its validity is crucially dependent 
upon both the conceptual definition of the credit constraint and the accuracy with which 
constrained households are identified in the first stage.  In addition, data requirements are steep 
as both traditional survey data on consumption, production, and costs as well as non-traditional 
data on individuals’ perceptions of credit markets must be collected.  Currently, there is little 
agreement in the literature regarding either how credit rationing should be defined or how to 
empirically identify rationed households. 2 
The primary contribution of this paper is methodological.  The specific goals of this 
paper are three-fold.  First, we provide a general discussion of the concept of credit rationing. 
This discussion is important because differences in empirical strategies for measuring credit 
constraints can originate in definitional differences.  To facilitate this discussion we develop a 
simple model to demonstrate that asymmetric information can give rise to three different 
‘mechanisms’ of non-price rationing – quantity, transaction costs, and risk.  Most empirical 
studies limit their definition of constrained households to those facing quantity rationing – which 
is essentially a binding supply-side constraint.  We argue, however, that this definition is 
incomplete as the consequences of asymmetric information may take the form of demand-side 
constraints associated with transaction costs and risk rationing.  Second, we describe and suggest 
strategies for dealing with the empirical challenges associated with identifying an individual’s, a 
household’s, or a firm’s rationing mechanism and constraint status.  Third, we use a unique data 
set from Peru to estimate the determinants of credit rationing.  The data set allows us to use 
different methods for classifying households as rationed and thus allows us to test the sensitivity 
of parameter estimates to choice of classification method.  
 
2. Non-price Rationing:  A Conceptual Framework 
In this section we develop a simple model of a credit market and activity choice.  The 
goal is not to develop any new theoretical result, but instead to introduce and motivate the 
conceptual categories of non-price rationing we use in the empirical sections that follow.
1   
Consider the following stylized model of credit demand and activity choice.  A farmer 
owns T acres of land and produces with a Leontief style technology requiring a fixed investment 
                                                 
1 For recent reviews of the theoretical literature on quantity rationing see Ghatak, Mookherjee, and Ray (2002) and 
Udry and Conning (2005). 3 
per-acre which, for simplicity, we will assume is $1.  The farmer has no liquidity and thus 
requires a loan to finance production.  The value of the farmer’s non-liquid assets, including land 
and machinery, is A.  To introduce uncertainty, we assume there are two possible states of nature 
– success and failure – that occur with probabilities p and 1-p respectively.  Revenue per unit 
land under success is Y and under failure is 0.  The farmer’s reservation activity is to rent out the 
land and earn a certain rent of w per unit land.  Risk neutral lenders operate in a perfectly 
competitive market and have an opportunity cost of capital equal to 1+γ.  Assume that 
w pY + + > ! 1  so that, in a first-best world, the farmer would always seek a loan and undertake 
production. 
 
2.1 Symmetric Information and the First-Best 
We begin by assuming that lenders can costlessly observe all relevant borrower 
characteristics and actions – i.e., they do not confront moral hazard or adverse selection.  A 
credit contract then specifies the borrower’s repayment obligation under each state.  Letting i 
denote the interest rate and k the per-unit land collateral requirement, the borrower repays (1+i)T 
under success and Tk under failure.  The borrower’s consumption in state j, Cj, is thus: 
 
 







= + $ +
=
failure j if Tk A
success j if i Y T A
C j








failure j if k
success j if i




In a world of symmetric information the optimal contract (1+i
*, k







where the first constraint ensures that the lender earns non-negative profits and the second 
constraint acknowledges that, at most, the borrower can post collateral worth A.  Using equation 
(1) in the above program, it is easy to show that the optimal contract in a first-best world would 
allow the borrower to earn the entire surplus (constraint (3a) binds) and allow the borrower to 
equate marginal utility – and thus consumption – across states of nature.  This simple model 
highlights the dual functions of the credit market as both provider of liquidity and, potentially, 
insurance.  In this first best world, risk neutral lenders are willing to trade higher interest rates for 
a reduction in a collateral at a constant rate of (1-p)/p.  Efficient risk sharing is thus achieved 
with the borrower paying a relatively high interest rate while fully insuring his consumption 
against production risk.  Thus even in the absence of a well functioning insurance market, all 
socially desirable investments will be made if credit markets are perfect.  We denote the farmer’s 
credit demand in this first-best world as his notional demand. 
 
2.2 Asymmetric Information and Non-Price Rationing 
As is well established in the theory literature, the presence of asymmetric information 
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incorporate asymmetric information into our stylized model by assuming that lenders require that 
borrowers post a minimum of k units of collateral per-unit land.  In addition, we assume that 
posting any amount of collateral implies a fixed cost of F to the borrower.
2  As discussed 
elsewhere, collateral provides incentives for borrowers to take costly actions that reduce the 
probability of failure and thereby addresses moral hazard (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).  Collateral 
may also serve as a mechanism for sorting borrowers of unobservable types (say project 
riskiness) and thereby may also address adverse selection (Bester, 1985).  While a complete 
model would endogenize k, that is beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, we simply assume k 
exists and is the same for all borrowers.
3 
  The presence of asymmetric information has immediate implications for the performance 
of our stylized credit market.  In terms of our optimization program, we must add an additional 
constraint:   k k ! .
4  While the lender is still willing to trade interest rate reductions for collateral 
increases at a rate of (1-p)/p, he is only willing to do so over a restricted range of contracts with 
sufficiently high collateral.  This restriction of the feasible contract set gives rise to the first form 
of non-price rationing – namely quantity rationing.  Farmers who cannot post the minimum 
required collateral (A < tk) are involuntarily excluded from the credit market.  Quantity rationing 
occurs when a farmer has a profitable project, and thus positive notional demand for credit, but 
faces zero supply. 
  As pointed out by several studies (Mushinski 1999, Japelli 1990) the availability of credit 
is necessary but not sufficient for a farmer with positive notional demand to have positive 
                                                 
2 Posting collateral typically requires verification of property deeds, verification that the property is not mortgaged 
to another party, and the actual registration of the mortgage itself.  Each of these transactions implies a trip to the 
property registry and a fee. 
3 See Boucher and Carter (2002) for an example of a model that endogenizes the collateral requirement in a model 
of moral hazard. 
4 Note that this constraint is essentially an incentive compatibility constraint in a model of moral hazard. 6 
effective demand, defined as the demand for contracts available in the “actually existing” or 
asymmetric information world.  First, transaction costs reduce the expected income associated 
with a credit contract by F.  As a result, a contract yields greater expected income than the 
reservation activity if  T F w pY / 1 + + + > ! .  Since transaction costs are assumed fixed, the 
expected income per unit land earned by the borrower from a given contract is increasing in farm 
size.  Thus – holding constant productivity and risk preferences – small farmers will be more 
likely to voluntarily withdraw from the credit market due to transaction costs.  A farmer who has 
positive notional demand but zero effective demand because of the size of transaction costs is 
called transaction cost rationed. 
Finally, even if transaction costs were negligible, the existence of an expected income 
enhancing contract is still not sufficient to guarantee a positive effective demand.  To see this, 
return to the minimum collateral requirement.  Another way to think about the collateral 
requirement is that it forces the borrower to bear a minimum amount of risk.
5  Thus even though 
available contracts raise the borrower’s expected consumption (compared to the reservation 
activity), they may lower the borrower’s expected utility because they force the borrower to bear 
too much risk.  In this case the borrower is risk rationed – he has access to an expected income 
enhancing contract but chooses to voluntarily withdraw from the credit market to instead 
undertake the lower return but certain reservation activity. 
If we assume zero transaction costs, then there will exist an agent with assets A
* (T) who 
– for a given farm size -- is indifferent between his credit contract and the reservation activity.  
Let r(A
* ) denote this borrower’s risk premium (per unit land) associated with the minimum 
                                                 
5 Indeed this is the intuition behind incentive compatibility under moral hazard.  By requiring collateral, a lender 
forces borrowers to internalize the consequences of actions they take that influence the probability distribution of 
project returns. 7 
collateral contract.  Then, by definition,  w pY A r ! + ! = ) 1 ( ) (
* " .  Any farmer with a lower risk 
premium would strictly prefer the minimum collateral contract while those with a higher risk 
premium would instead prefer the reservation activity.  Thus if we assume farmers’ risk 
preferences are described by decreasing absolute risk aversion, we conclude that, holding farm 
size constant, poorer borrowers – those with A < A
* -- will be more likely to be risk rationed.
6  
To summarize, we have seen that asymmetric information can give rise to three types of 
non-price rationing.  The first, quantity rationing, is perhaps the most obvious and has been 
emphasized in both the theory and empirical literature.  Quantity rationing is solely a supply side 
phenomenon.  In our simple model of fixed investment, it is defined by an empty feasible 
contract set.  In general, quantity rationing occurs when a borrower’s effective demand exceeds 
supply.  In contrast, both transaction cost and risk rationing, which are defined conditional on a 
non-empty contract set, bring in the demand side.  Any evaluation of the performance of credit 
markets should thus attempt to account for all three forms of non-price rationing.  How to 
classify households into the appropriate rationing category is the task to which we now turn. 
 
3. Measuring Credit Constraints – a Practical Approach 
In this section we discuss the issues involved in classifying households as unconstrained 
(price rationed) versus constrained (non-price rationed) and, how we can further distinguish 
between supply-side (quantity) versus demand-side (risk or transaction costs) rationing 
mechanisms among constrained households.  The discussion here essentially outlines variants of 
the strategy used in several household surveys, including the survey in Peru which will be the 
basis for the empirical analysis of section 4. 
                                                 
6 Note that if we allow for full endogeneity of contract terms to borrower wealth, this need not occur.  As shown by 
Newman (1995) and Thiele and Wambagh (1999), the relatively wealthy may be more likely to be risk rationed. 8 
 
3.1 Defining Constraint Categories 
Let 
E
i D and 
N
i D denote, respectively, the effective and notional demands for credit of 
household i.  Similarly, let Si denote the maximum amount of credit a formal lender is willing to 
supply to the same household. The conceptual discussion from section 2 implies that a household 
(or individual or firm) will fall into one of three mutually exclusive categories:  unconstrained, 
supply-side constrained, and demand-side constrained.  We describe each in turn. 
Unconstrained, or price-rationed, households are unaffected by asymmetric information 
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While asymmetric information may imply that lenders impose a credit limit, this limit will not be 
binding for unconstrained households.  Depending on their endowments and opportunities, 
unconstrained households may be either borrowers ( 0 >
E
i D ) or non-borrowers.  Resource 
allocation decisions of unconstrained households are unaffected by information asymmetries. 
  Supply-side constrained, or quantity rationed, households face a binding credit limit and 
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Note that while asymmetric information may reduce these households’ effective demand relative 
to their notional demand, the limiting constraint comes from the supply side.  As such, we expect 
these households to demonstrate an expression of excess demand in the real world.  We will deal 
with the question of how to capture this expression in the next section. 9 
  Finally, demand-side constrained households do not face a binding credit limit and thus 
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The risk sharing rules of the contract or the transaction costs associated with loan application 
drive a wedge between their notional and effective demand so that they are demand-side 
rationed.   The primary empirical challenge is thus to distinguish demand-side constrained from 
unconstrained households.  Neither expresses any excess demand, yet the former group’s 
effective demand – and thus also their resource allocation – is adversely affected by asymmetric 
information in credit markets. 
   
3.2 Operationalization of Constraint Categories 
Our overall goal is to identify whether or not a given household is constrained in the 
credit market.  The discussion above indicates that the binding constraint may derive either from 
the supply or the demand side.  In either case, the mechanism by which the household is rationed 
in the credit market is not price.  In the case of a supply-side constraint, the rationing mechanism 
is quantity while in the case of a demand-side constraint the mechanism is either transaction 
costs or risk. 
We now turn to operationalizing the classification scheme described above.  We begin 
with supply-side constrained households.  Essentially, condition (C2) will hold if a household 
received less than its desired amount of credit given the available contract terms.  In identifying 
these supply-side constrained households from survey data, it is useful to distinguish three 
separate groups.  The first supply-side constrained group is unsatisfied borrowers, who apply for 10 
and receive a loan, however the loan amount is less than their effective demand.  The second 
group is rejected applicants, who have positive effective demand but a zero credit limit.  The 
final supply-side constrained group is certainly-rejected non-applicants, who have positive 
effective demand but do not apply for a loan because – based on past experience or their 
perceptions of lenders’ supply rules – they are certain their loan application would be rejcted. 
Although each of these three groups is supply-constrained, given the typical structure of 
household surveys, their identification relies on different sets of questions.  Figures 1 and 2 
provide examples of the types of questions required to identify these three groups.  Figure 1 
shows several questions from the loan characteristics table.  Note that the unit of observation (i.e. 
the row) is the received loan itself.  The response to question 5 allows us to identify unsatisfied 
borrowers.  There are two details to note in the formulation of this question.  First, the borrower 
is asked to compare the amount received to the amount that he/she wanted.  While it might seem 
intuitive to compare the amount received with the amount applied for, this would be problematic 
since the borrower may know the lender’s supply rule and thus only ask for the amount they 
qualify for, even though this amount is less than their effective demand.  The second thing to 
note is that the question must emphasize that the desired amount is conditional upon the interest 
rate available.  Finally, although not essential for our present purpose of binary categorization of 
constraint status, question 5 can be followed by a question that asks the desired loan size.  This 
would then identify a point on the borrower’s demand curve and is thus useful for answering a 
different set of question such as the shadow value of liquidity. 
Since neither rejected applicants nor certainly-rejected non-applicants received a loan, the 
information from the loan characteristics table (Figure 1) provides no information about their 
constraint status.  Instead, we turn to Figure 2, which describes non-borrowers’ experience in and 11 
perceptions of the loan market of interest.  After completing the loan characteristics table, 
enumerators determine whether or not the household had any loans from the sector of interest 
and, if not, the enumerator would apply the survey module depicted in Figure 2.  The primary 
objective of this module is to sort all non-borrowers into their constraint category.  Question 2 
differentiates rejected applicants from non-applicants.  Our second group of supply-side 
constrained households is thus identified by their response to this question.  A specific issue is 
the time frame specified in this question.  If a household’s credit limit were time invariant, then 
the appropriate question would be whether or not the household has ever been rejected.  If, as is 
more likely, the credit limit changes over time then a shorter recall period is preferable.    
Questions 3, 4, and 5 are again not necessary for the binary constraint classification, however 
they provide quantitative information on loan demand as well as qualitative information on 
perceived reasons for loan rejection. 
The third supply-side constrained group was the certainly rejected non-applicants.  As 
these are non-borrowers, we again use this module to classify these households’ constraint status.  
To do so, the enumerator first asks question 6 to see if the household believes it could get a loan.  
If yes, then we know that the household is not supply-side constrained.  If no, the enumerator 
continues with the hypothetical question 9:  “If you were certain that a lender would approve 
your application, would you apply?”  If yes, then the household is classified as constrained.  One 
specific issue to be aware of is the wording of question 9.  Notice that we do not ask “would you 
accept a loan if you were offered one?”  The reason is that the word “offered” may imply that the 
respondent need not incur the costs of application.  
We now turn to identifying demand-side constrained households.  We begin by noting 
that, as in the case of supply-side constraints, demand-side constrained households can be either 12 
borrowers or non-borrowers.  In line with the conceptual discussion of section 2, there are two 
main reasons why a borrower’s effective demand may be less than his or her notional demand, 
namely transaction costs and contractual risk.  Since transaction costs associated with loan 
application tend to have an important fixed component, we expect that, among borrowers, risk is 
likely to be more important than transaction costs in impacting effective demand. 
In practice, it is very difficult to distinguish risk rationed (demand-constrained) borrowers 
from unconstrained borrowers.  To do so requires capturing how the amount demanded would be 
affected by changes in risk sharing rules while holding constant the borrower’s expected 
monetary return from the contract.  Essentially, this would require asking if loan demand would 
increase if collateral were reduced as interest rate was increased.  This approach is problematic 
since collateral is difficult, if not impossible, to adjust at the margin (i.e. it is not feasible to put 
up only nine-tenths of a farm parcel).  As a result, this then requires asking about demand under 
a contract with zero collateral and a relatively high interest rate.  Our experience has shown that 
responses to this type of approach do not capture the desired information.  Farmers were highly 
skeptical (and rightly so!) about banks that might offer a zero-collateral loan.  One respondent 
summed up this problem as follows:  “I’d be crazy to take a loan from a bank that doesn’t ask for 
my land…that would not be a serious institution so who knows what problems I might get into?”  
In our judgement, then, attempting to identify the group of risk rationed borrowers may not be 
worthwhile.  While the cost of doing so is high, the benefit is likely to be low in the sense that 
the resource allocation of risk rationed borrowers is likely to differ little compared to 
unconstrained borrowers.  On one hand, as pointed out by several theoretical models, when 
contract terms are endogenous to borrower characteristics, smaller, less risky loans are not made 
available by lenders because lenders require the borrower to bear a certain amount of risk to 13 
overcome moral hazard in borrower effort or project choice (Newman 1995).  In addition, and as 
mentioned above, collateral assets are typically very lumpy and cannot be marginally adjusted.  
Thus by taking a slightly smaller loan, the borrower cannot reduce their loss under default.  
Finally, in practice, there may be little scope for varying loan size as many agricultural lenders 
offer boilerplate, or formulaic, loan contracts in which loan size is a fixed multiple of area 
cultivated. 
The second type of demand-side constrained households, and the ones we focus on here, 
is demand-side constrained non-applicants.  Again Figure 2 provides information to classify 
these non-applicant households.  Non-applicants are first divided into those who believe they 
would be offered a loan if they applied (answer “Yes” to question 6) and those who would not be 
offered a loan (answer “No” to question 6).  We classify this first group into demand-side 
constrained versus unconstrained by following up with question 7 which asks why – given that 
they could get a loan – they did not apply for one.  Table 1 provides a sample of the most 
common responses to this question and their subsequent classification as constrained or 
unconstrained.  Households are classified as unconstrained if their response indicates that the 
expected rate of return to their investment or use of funds is less than the expected monetary 
costs of the loan.  Households are classified as constrained if their response indicates that either 
risk or transaction costs were the primary reason that dissuaded them from borrowing.  The 
second group, those who believe the lender would not approve their application, are then asked 
in question 9 whether they would want a loan if they were certain the lender would approve their 
application.  As discussed above, those who say “yes” are the certainly-rejected non-applicants 
who are classified as supply-side rationed.  Those who say “no” are then asked why.  The same 14 
types of responses as are outlined in Table 1 are then used to classify them as constrained or 
unconstrained. 
 
3.3 Issues and Challenges in Classification via Direct Elicitation 
  As suggested above, use of the direct elicitation approach requires a significant amount of 
information not typically collected in multi-purpose household surveys.  Thus the time and 
resources required to successfully implement the approach are non-trivial.  In this section we 
raise and discuss three general issues that arise in utilizing the method. 
 
Issue 1: Definition of Loan Sectors 
There are two main reasons to define distinct sectors or segments of the credit market and to then 
cast the language of the qualitative questions in Figure 2 with respect to these sectors.  First, if 
the terms of credit contracts differ systematically across types of lenders, then households may 
have a clear preference ordering with respect to loan source.  A household could then be 
constrained with respect to their preferred loan source but unconstrained with respect to less 
preferred sources.  To classify this household as constrained, we need to dinstinguish between 
the two loan sources.  In general, if there exists a clear hierarchy across lender types, at a 
minimum we should apply the classification methodology to determine constraint status with 
respect to the most preferred sector.  For example, in a study of rural credit markets in India, 
Bell, Udry and Srinivasan (1997) assume that loans from the formal sector (agricultural 
cooperatives) are, if available, strictly preferred to informal loans from traders.  As such, any 
household observed with an informal loan can be classified as constrained with respect to the 
formal sector. 15 
  The second, and perhaps more obvious, reason to define and refer to loan sectors is that 
the researcher may have sector (or even institution) specific hypotheses.  For example, we might 
be interested in evaluating a policy that affects a certain type of institution.  Mushinsky (1999) 
evaluates the impact of market oriented reforms implemented by credit unions in Guatemala on 
the prevalence of non-price rationing in the credit unions.  We also might be interested in testing 
the existence of a preference hierarchy across loan sectors.  Kochar (1997), for example, 
questions the assumption that the formal loan sector is the most preferred sector.  A sector 
specific application of this method would be useful in this case. 
  The most common sectoral definition are “formal” and “informal.”  The distinction 
between formal versus informal sectors may be based on many alternative lender characteristics.  
Common criteria include:  Is the lender regulated?  Does the lender lend for profit?  Is the lender 
specialized in financial intermediation?  Of course the classification need not be binary.  In our 
study of credit markets in rural Peru, we distinguish amongst four types of regulated lending 
institutions:  commercial banks, municipal banks, rural banks, and finance companies.  While 
each of these institutions is regulated by the central bank, there are differences in the specific 
rules and regulations that apply to each type.  No matter what sectoral definition is chosen, the 
researcher needs to formulate clear rules so that the enumerators consistently assign lenders into 
the appropriate sector, enabling them to correctly apply the sequence of questions described 
above (for example, see question 3 of Figure 1). 
 
Issue 2: Use of Hypothetical Questions 
  As described above, the classification of non-applicants’ constraint status relies upon 
hypothetical questions.  All non-applicants are asked if a lender would approve their loan 16 
application if they were to apply.  This question is potentially problematic for several reasons.  
First, this question introduces a change in the tone of the survey.  Until this point in the survey, 
the respondent is likely to have been bombarded with “factual” recall questions.  The enumerator 
now asks the respondent to change gears and think about the outcome of a loan application that 
was not made.  Clearly communicating the idea behind this question is thus a non-trivial 
exercise.  Beyond a clear phrasing of the question itself, effective use of this type of hypothetical 
question requires careful selection and training of enumerators, who may need to step outside of 
the literal question in order to convey the idea. 
  Assuming the question is clearly conveyed and understood, we face an additional issue.  
We want to establish whether or not the household has a strictly positive credit limit.  Since we 
rely on the respondent’s perception of the lender’s decision, error is introduced into the data.  
The consequences of this error regarding hypothetical supply are less problematic, however, than 
might first appear.  There are two types of potential errors.  Consider first overly-pessimistic 
non-applicants who incorrectly believe they would be rejected.  If they have no effective 
demand, they will not be incorrectly classifies as supply-side constrained.  On the other hand, if 
they have positive effective demand, they will appear as supply-side constrained even though a 
lender would approve their application.  However, we do not consider this a mis-classification 
because the household’s behavior is indeed determined by the perception of the constraint and 
not the “actual” constraint.  Overly optimistic non-applicants, who incorrectly believe the lender 
in question would offer a loan, have no effective demand and thus would never be classified as 
supply-side constrained. 
  A related issue is that in order to classify non-applicants as constrained or unconstrained 
we need to know whether or not they have positive effective demand which, in turn, depends 17 
upon the household’s perception of contracts available in the market.  Since these non-applicant 
households are not participating in the credit market, they may be unfamiliar with existing terms.  
In pre-liberalization Peru, for example, the primary formal lender was the state development 
bank (Banco Agrario) which offered loan contracts with subsidized, and sometimes negative, 
real interest rates and did not require collateral.   Many farmers have not borrowed from the 
formal sector since the state bank shut down in 1992. Consequently, the market conditions that 
these farmers have in mind when answering the question about their willingness to accept a 
formal loan may still be those of these highly subsidized loans. In the phrasing of the 
questionnaire it is essential to precisely define which institutions are included in the formal 
sector.  The researcher may also use auxiliary information to gauge the accuracy of the 
respondent’s perceptions.  The quality of data analysis may be raised by controlling for the 
household’s integration into the formal financial market. Useful controls include: the coverage of 
the formal sector in the zone, individual farmer/household credit history, general access to 
information at the household level, and whether or not the household has friends or family with a 
formal loan.  A potential strategy which does not require making the assumption that farmer have 
strong familiarity with “relevant market conditions” is to add precision about a given credit 
product in the hypothetical questions. This solution has a fundamental drawback, however, as 
credit terms may differ both across borrowers and lenders so that the given contract may not 
reflect the contracts available to the household. 
 
Issue 3:  Household versus Individual Constraint? 
  The final issue we take up is whether the credit constraint classification should be made 
at the household or individual level.  Up until now, we have couched the discussion at the 18 
household level.  This approach is consistent if we believe the household behaves in line with a 
“unitary” household model in which endowments and income are pooled amongst household 
members.  Under this assumption, we would direct the qualitative questions of Table 2 to the 
household head, who would respond for the overall household.  We implicitly assume that the 
head can, given the endowments and opportunities available to the household, assess the 
effective and notional demand of --  as well as the supply available to -- the entire household. 
  If, in contrast, resources are not pooled within the household or information is not shared, 
then individual characteristics – including whether or not individuals are credit constrained – 
may impact the household’s resource allocation.  In this case, we would need to elicit the 
constraint status at the individual level.  This individual approach, while costly, is useful for 
testing hypotheses related to gender bias in credit access and intra-household resource allocation 
processes. 
In sum, while there are many potential pitfalls in implementing the direct approach, we 
feel that with sufficient training and fieldwork preparation, the approach can yield reasonable 
classification of households’ (or individuals’) constraint status.  In the next section we 
demonstrate the importance of the means used to directly elicit constraint status by carrying out 
an econometric exercise that examines two hypotheses regarding the determinants of credit 
rationing. 
 
4. Empirical Application: Determinants of Non-Price Rationing in Piura, Peru 
In this section we use a data set that used the direct elicitation approach to analyze how 
the inclusion of demand-side constraints impacts our evaluation of the determinants of credit 
rationing.  We will explore two particular determinants of constraint status that have been the 19 
focus of much of the empirical literature, namely the household’s wealth and the possession of a 
land title.   
Our empirical exercise compares the determinants of credit constraints across our two 
alternative definitions of credit constraint.  The first definition – which we will call the restrictive 
definition – classifies as credit constrained only those households that are supply-side 
constrained.  According to this restrictive definition, a household is classified as constrained if 
and only if condition C2 holds (i.e. the household’s effective demand exceeds available supply).  
The second – and we feel more appropriate – definition classifies a household as constrained if it 
is constrained either from the supply or demand side.  This definition, which we call the 
comprehensive definition, classifies a household as constrained if either condition C2 or C3 
holds.  Our objective is not to separate the impact of explanatory variables on credit supply and 
on credit demand, but instead to evaluate their effect on the probability that a household is credit 
constrained under the alternative constraint definitions.  Therefore, we estimate a reduced form 
logit equation with the binary credit constraint status as the dependent variable.  We carry out the 
estimation twice – first constructing the households’ constraint status using the restrictive 
definition and then using the comprehensive definition. 
The analysis of the determinants of credit constraints answers important questions in and 
of itself.  It also corresponds to the first stage of many studies aimed at evaluating the impact of 
credit constraints on household-specific outcomes.  Indeed, in order to control for potential 
selection bias in the estimation of the “impact equation,” a selection model needs to be 
estimated.  Feder et. al. (1992), Carter and Olinto (2003) and Foltz (2004) provide examples of 
this general approach in studies analyzing impacts of credit constraint on investment or 20 
productivity.   We focus on two determinants of credit constraints that have been the focus of the 
empirical literature: household wealth and the possession of a land title. 
 
4.1 Title, Wealth, and Credit Constraints 
  We first examine the relationship between the probability of being credit constrained and 
the possession of a land title.  As summarized by Besley (1995), there are two main mechanisms 
by which gaining access to a title may affect a household’s credit market participation.  First, 
titled land may be offered as collateral and thus may loosen a binding supply-side constraint.  
Second, by enhancing tenure security and reducing the transaction costs of land transactions, a 
title may increase a household’s investment demand.  A household that was previously 
discouraged from borrowing by risk or transaction costs, may – upon receipt of a title -- seek a 
loan so that their constraint status may change.  In our context of northern Peru, land tenure is 
secure and independent of title.  We anticipate, then, that – at least in our context – the primary 
mechanism by which title may affect a household’s credit constraint status is via relaxing supply-
constraints.  As such, we expect that while possession of a land title will reduce the probability 
of  being credit constrained under both the restrictive and comprehensive constraint definitions, 
the impact will be larger using the restrictive (supply-side) definition. 
  The second explanatory variable we focus on is household wealth.  As in the case of title, 
there are multiple mechanisms by which a household’s wealth (holding title constant) may 
impact its constraint status.  If household wealth is observable to lenders, it may be taken as a 
positive signal of capacity to repay both because high current wealth is likely to be positively 
correlated with the household’s ability and the quality of their investment projects.  Wealthier 
households are also likely to be less affected by demand-side constraints.  If total wealth is 21 
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positively correlated with the size or scale of a household’s productive activities – as is certainly 
the case in rural areas where farmland is the most important asset – then fixed transaction costs 
are less likely to deter wealthier households from applying for loans than poor households.  
Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, wealthier households would, holding 
constant the risk-sharing rules of credit contracts, be less likely to be risk rationed than poorer 
households.
7  Given that lower wealth households are more likely to be demand-side constrained, 
this discussion suggests that the impact of using the restrictive instead of comprehensive 
constraint definition on the estimated probability of credit rationing is likely to be decreasing in 
household wealth. 
 
4.2 Econometric model 
We examine the relationships discussed above by estimating a reduced form logit model.  Let 
Ci indicate the credit constraint status of household i, taking value 1 if the household is 








TITLEi is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the household owns at least one parcel 
with a registered property title.  WEALTHi is the value of household’s wealth and includes the 
value of residential land, farm and business assets, household durables, and financial assets.  Hi 
                                                 
7 If, however, contract terms are endogenous to borrower wealth, then it is possible that wealthier households are 
more likely to be risk rationed than poor households.  This general theoretical point is made by Thiele and 
Wambaugh (1999).  Boucher and Carter (2003) show this result in the case of credit contracts. 22 
is a vector of household characteristics including the area of owned farm land, household size, 
education of the household head, and the dependency ratio.  Zi is a vector of geographic and year 
variables.  Finally, α0, α1, α2, γ, and λ, are parameters to be estimated. 
As will be described shortly, the data used for estimation come from a panel of household 
surveys.  This allows us to estimate the model in two ways: a logit on the pooled sample with 
cluster robust standard errors; and a conditional – or fixed effects -- logit. The main advantages 
of the pooled estimation are that it:  uses information from the full sample; allows the estimation 
of the coefficients associated with time invariant variables; permits the estimation of predicted 
probabilities and marginal impacts of the regressors.  The pooled estimation, however, does not 
fully address the potential endogeneity problems that arise in our context.  In particular, we are 
concerned about a potential bias in our estimates of α1 and α2 – the coefficients associated with 
title and wealth – that may arise if unobserved characteristics such as land quality, past credit 
history or the aptitude to deal with loan paperwork impact both the probability of being 
constrained and the household’s wealth.  
While we partially address this issue by including regressors that capture some aspects of 
credit history (one dummy to indicate whether the household ever used formal credit and another 
to indicate if the household ever defaulted) and farmer ability (education and farm experience),  
unobserved heterogeneity remains a concern as we do not have controls for land quality. The 
fixed-effect logit estimation produces parameter estimates that are robust to biases introduced by 
time invariant unobserved factors and therefore addresses the issue of the endogeneity of title 
and wealth as long as the source of this endogeneity is time-invariant. The fixed-effect logit, 
however, has two drawbacks.  First, since parameter estimates are identified by the subset of 
households that change rationing status over time, the sample size is reduced.  If the cross-23 
sectional sample size is small – as in our case – the inability to use the full sample information 
may be costly.  Second, because consistent estimates of the household fixed effect cannot be 
computed, neither marginal effects nor predicted probabilities of being constrained can be 
calculated.  
 
4.3 Data and context 
The data come from a survey administered to farm households in 1997 and again in 2003 in 
the department of Piura, on Peru’s north coast.  The sample was drawn from the comprehensive 
lists maintained by the irrigation commissions (comisiones de regantes) and is representative of 
irrigated, commercial agriculture in the department.
8  Of the original 547 households surveyed in 
1997, 499 were resurveyed in 2003.  The empirical analysis in this paper is based on these 499 
households.  In addition to conventional demographic and production modules, the survey 
contains a section, similar to the one described in Section 3, that explores in-depth borrowers’ 
and non-borrowers’ experiences in and perceptions of the credit market.  The survey thus permits 
the classification of households as constrained or unconstrained according to both the restrictive 
and comprehensive definitions of credit constraint. 
Table 2 provides descriptive characteristics of sample households.  The mean farm size is 
just over 4 hectares .  This reflects the unique agrarian structure of Peru.  As a result of the 
agrarian reform of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the large landholding class was eliminated so that the 
vast majority of high quality, irrigated farm land is controlled by small-holders.  Farmers in Piura 
produce a variety of annual and perennial crops.  While historically, cotton has dominated the 
local economy, falling cotton prices and rising input costs have led to a large-scale substitution 
                                                 
8 Boucher (2000) provides a detailed description of the sample design. 24 
away from cotton and into rice and corn in recent years.  Piura’s tropical climate and relatively 
good port access also favor the production of perennial exports such as bananas and mango. 
Until 1992, the state’s agricultural development bank – Banco Agrario – held a monopoly 
over formal credit delivery to the agricultural sector in Peru.  This changed dramatically when 
the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990 – 2000) implemented a financial liberalization 
program that shut down the Banco Agrario in 1992 and eliminated interest rate controls.  The 
banking law was also rewritten in order to create a secure environment for commercial banks to 
lend and to promote rural and municipal banks (Cajas Rurales and Cajas Municipales).  These 
latter two institutions were expected to attend to the needs of the sector of small commercial 
producers that would likely by neglected by commercial banks.   In the post-liberalization period, 
growth of formal lending to agriculture was truncated by a series of crises in the late 1990’s.  In 
1998, Peru – and particularly Piura – experienced a severe El Niño occurrence and the lagged 
impacts of the Mexican Peso crisis.  This was followed by a serious political crisis culminating 
in the fleeing of Fujimori to Japan in 2000. With the agricultural sector severely depressed, the 
re-establishment of an agricultural development bank was placed back on the political agenda in 
the presidential election of 2000.  Indeed in 2003, current president Alejandro Toledo made good 
on his campaign promise by opening Agrobanco – a new state bank operating primarily as a 
second-tier institution.  As of 2003 – the year of the second survey – Agrobanco was not yet an 
important source of loans. 
Table 3 describes credit market participation of sample households in the two survey years.  
Consistent with the formal sector crisis, the fraction of sample households borrowing from the 
formal sector fell slightly from 26% in 1997 to 24% in 2003.  Borrowing from informal sources 25 
decreased more, with the percentage of sample households with an informal loan decreasing 
from 49% to 39%. 
Table 4 compares the percentage of households that are classified as constrained when using 
the restrictive versus comprehensive definitions.  Two results merit comment.  First, use of the 
restrictive constraint definition leads to a significant underestimate of the prevalence of credit 
constraints.  In 1997, 20 percent of the sample was demand-side constrained (of which 11% was 
accounted for by transaction costs and 9% by risk) while in 2003 this percentage increased to 36 
percent (of which 13% was accounted for by transaction costs and 23% by risk).  Second, there 
is a marked decrease in the overall frequency of credit constraints, and this result holds 
independently of the constraint definition.  While the decrease in constraint frequency could 
result from households accumulating wealth, experience and perhaps a credit history, this view is 
overly optimistic.  As mentioned above, the frequency of formal loan receipt actually declined 
from 1997 to 2003.  This decrease in formal loan use appears to have been accompanied by a 
decrease in both notional and effective demand. A more likely explanation for this decrease is 
the general crisis of the agricultural sector and the lower profitability of the agricultural sector. 
 
4.4 Econometric Results 
Table 5 presents parameter estimates from the pooled and fixed-effect logits.
9  As mentioned 
earlier, since the fixed effect estimation does not generate estimates of the household fixed 
effect, marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of being non-price 
rationed cannot be computed. However the magnitude of the coefficients can be interpreted by 
converting them to odds ratios. To enable a comparison of coefficient magnitudes across 
                                                 
9 We also estimated a random effect logit.  The results are virtually identical to those of the pooled logit and are thus 
not reported here.  26 
estimations we report all coefficients in this form.
10 Note that for both definitions of credit 
constraint, the pooled and the fixed effect estimations yield similar results in terms of the 
coefficient significance and their size.  
We begin by examining the role of title on the constraint probability.  Under both constraint 
definitions, the coefficient on the title variable is significant and the odds ratio is smaller than 
one so that, in line with our expectation, the possession of a title decreases the probability of 
being credit constrained. Furthermore, the odds ratio is smaller when the restrictive definition is 
used.  The coefficient estimates under restricted and comprehensive definitions are 0.38 and 0.58 
respectively.  This suggests that, owning a title reduces the odds of being constrained by more 
than 60% when the restrictive constraint definition is used but only by about 40% when the 
comprehensive definition is used.  Even if the point estimates are outside of each other’s 
confidence intervals, those confidence intervals overlap so that there is weak statistical evidence 
that the point estimates are different.  In conclusion, owning a title significantly reduces the odds 
of being constrained under both definitions of credit constraint, and the point estimates suggest 
that the effect is stronger when the restrictive definition is used.  
We now turn to the role of household wealth.  While we have no prior about the relative size 
of the coefficient on wealth across definitions, we do expect that the difference in the predicted 
probability of being constrained -- Pr(C=1|Restricted Definition)-Pr(C=1|Comprehensive 
Definition) -- is decreasing in wealth.  
As we already mentioned, we cannot generate these probabilities using the fixed effect logit 
estimation. We will therefore rely on the parameters generated by the pooled logit estimation 
                                                 
10 The odds ratio represents the estimated factor by which the independent variable impacts the odds of the outcome. 
The odds ratio equals e^{β} so that the absence of effect corresponds an odds ratio of 1 (e⒡=1). Odds ratios greater 
than one indicate a positive effect of the independent variable on the response while odds ratios smaller than one are 
equivalent to negative impacts. 27 
with cluster robust standard errors. Figure 3 graphs – for the two constraint definitions -- the 
predicted probabilities of being constrained as a function of household wealth along with 95% 
confidence bands.
11  Figure 3 shows a significantly lower constraint probability using the 
restrictive definition for wealth levels less than $40,000. The difference for higher wealth levels 
is not statistically significant.  Of course the lower probability of being constrained under the 
restrictive definition is not surprising.  By definition, the restrictive definition delivers a higher 
frequency of credit constraints. The more important question is whether or not this difference 
varies by household wealth. Figure 4 confirms our hypothesis.  This figure plots the difference in 
predicted probabilities (the vertical difference between the two curves in Figure 3) using the two 
classification methods.  At the lowest wealth levels, the comprehensive rationing definition  
yields nearly a 50% higher probability of non-price rationing than the restrictive definition.  This 
difference then falls to less than 10% as wealth reaches the top wealth decile (over $100,000).  
As in the case of title, the estimated relationship between the probability of being credit 
constrained and the household’s wealth is significantly impacted by the choice of how we define 
a household as credit constrained. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  Given the prevalence of financial market liberalizations throughout the developing world 
in the last two decades and the continued concentration of poverty in rural areas, much attention 
has been focused on evaluating the “health” or performance of rural credit markets.  A key 
indicator of the health of a credit market is the frequency by which individuals, households, or 
                                                 
11 All other regressors, except dummy variables, are set equal to the sample mean.  With respect to the dummy 
variables, Figure 1 is drawn for a farming household (nofarm=0) in 2003 that has no title for his land, did not dealt 
with formal institution in the past and did not report having ever defaulted. These choices are not critical to the 
shape of the curves. 28 
firms find themselves constrained in their access to credit.  As such, classifying households as 
credit constrained or unconstrained has become an increasingly important empirical exercise. 
In this paper, we have argued for a careful and comprehensive conceptual definition of 
constraint based on the potential for information asymmetries to manifest themselves not only 
via familiar quantity rationing, but also through what we term “demand-side” constraints 
associated with risk and transaction costs.  Based on this more theoretically complete constraint 
definition, we described the “direct elicitation” approach to identifying credit constraints in 
household surveys.  While the costs of implementing the direct approach are non-trivial, we feel 
they are warranted. 
In particular, this approach allows the researcher to identify the relative importance of the 
different underlying causes of credit constraints.  Our empirical analysis showed, for example, 
that if we relied only on the restrictive supply-side constraint definition, we would have 
concluded that credit market conditions improved considerably between 1997 and 2003 since the 
frequency of supply-side constraints decreased from 45% to 13%.  However, once we account 
for risk and transaction cost induced constraints, we see that the frequency of constraints, while 
also declining (from 65% to 49%), remains quite high.  This result also highlights the importance 
of understanding the underlying source of credit constraints in order to alleviate them.  Again, 
for example, our results suggest that attention to risk mitigation is potentially as important as 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Common answers to qualitative rationing questions 
“Why did (would) you not apply for a formal loan?”  Constraint Status 
I do not need a loan 
Interest rate is too high 
Farming does not give me enough to repay a debt 
Unconstrained 
(Price Rationed) 
I don’t want to risk my land 
I do not want to be worried, I am afraid 
Formal lenders are too strict, they are not as flexible as informal ones 
Formal lenders do not offer refinancing 
Constrained 
(Risk Rationed) 
The branch is too far away 
The is too much paperwork, too much costs associated with application 
Constrained 
(Transaction Cost Rationed) 
 







Farm size (hectares)  4.32  4.13 
Household wealth (thousand $)  6.58  4.02 
Education of head (years)  4.58  4.87 
% of households with:     
  Corn  48.3  27.5 
  Cotton  31.3  9.4 
  Rice  48.1  50.7 
  Banana  22.0  28.9 
  Lemon  37.9  15.0 
  Mango  10.2  8.8 
Source: UC-Davis/BASIS survey. 32 
 
Table 3. Participation of Sample Households in Credit Market 
% of Households with:  1997  2003 
Only Formal Loan  19.3  18.8 
Only Informal Loan  42.2  34.7 
Both Formal & Informal  6.6  5.8 
No loans  31.8  41.7 
Source: UC-Davis/BASIS survey. 
 
Table 4. The Frequency of Credit Constraints According to Two Classification Methods 




45%  55%  13%  87% 
Comprehensive 
(Supply or Demand-Side 
Constrained) 
65%  35%  49%  51% 
 
 
Table 5. Coefficient Estimates:  Determinants of Non-Price Rationing 
  Rationing status using C2  Rationing status using C2 or 
C3 
Variable  fixed effect  Pooled  fixed effect  pooled 
Title  0.3803**  0.3567**  0.5818*  0.4541** 
Wealth  0.9107**  0.9411**  0.9575*  0.9573** 
Household size  1.2263**  1.0065  1.0774  0.9853 
Time  0.1654**  0.2513**  0.5969**  0.6731** 
Area owned  0.8216  1.015  0.9102  1.0087 
No farming dummy  0.3024  1.3496  0.4102  1.1778 
Experience     0.9981    1.0145** 
Education     1.0074    0.968 
Default dummy    2.4368**    1.3876* 
Loan history    0.9779    0.8108** 
Constant    0.9995    3.0508** 
*: significant at 10% **: significant at 5% 
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What is the name of 
the individual or 
institution that you 
borrowed from? 
3. 
What type of 
lender was this? 
(see code A 
below) 
4. 
What was the 
value of this 
loan? 
5. 
Would you have 
wanted a larger 
loan at this same 
interest rate? 
1         
2         
3         
CODE A 





















2. Have you ever  
applied for a bank 
loan and been 
rejected? 





4. In which 
year? 
 




(skip to next 
section) 
6. Would a bank 
lend to you if you 
applied? 
7. Why did you 
not apply? 
 
(skip to next 
section) 
8. Why not? 
9. If you were sure that a 
bank would approve 
your application, would 




YES  NO 
10. Why not? 
 





















YES  NO 
YES  NO 
1.  [Instructions: Do not read this question out loud.]  According to the Active Credit 
Table, did this household receive any loan from a bank in the past 12 months? 
 
Yes    Skip to the next section    NO    Continue with question 2 





























































Figure 4. Difference in predicted constraint probabilities across definitions 
 
 